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COPYRIGHT LAW APPLIED TO RADIO
BROADCASTING
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT
THE CONS
T IT U T IONAL authority for Congressional 
leg-
islation respecting copyright law is found in Article 1, Sec-
tion 8 of the Federal Constitution, wherein Congress is given
power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts; by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries." This
constitutional guaranty to authors and inventors of protection
in their work called forth the copyright law,3 giving to
authors, composers, inventors, etc. -the protection that their
creative genius merited. The important parts of the copyright
act 4 for this discussion are as follows:
Art. 1. Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the
provisions of this act, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted
work; ....
(b) to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if
it be a musical composition and for the purpose of public per-
formance for profit; and for the purposes set forth in subsec-
tion (a) hereof, to make any arrangment or setting of it or of
-the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of
record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and
and from which it may be read or reproduced.
It is particularly section (e) of the above enactment that
has caused difficulty in the application of the copyright law
to the field of radio broadcasting. A great deal of litigation has
centered about the interpretation of the clause, "public per-
1 291 Fed. 776 (D. C. N. J. 1923).
2 At common law the author of an unpublished proprietary work was given an
absolute proprietary 'right therein. Whether this common law proprietary right ceased
on the first publication, the English view (early English view) held 'that it did not.
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Reprint 201 (1774); Donaldsons v. Beckett, 4
Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Reprint 257 (1774 . The American view however tends to the
contrary. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055 (1834) ; Caliga v. Inter Ocean
Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 30 S. Ct. Rep. 38, 54 L. ed. 105 (1900) ; Palmer v. DeWitt,
47 N. Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480 (1872) ; Bamforth v. Douglass Post Card Machine Co., 158
Fed. 355 (E. D. Pa. 1908).
3 Act of March 4, 1909, Chai. 320, Sections 1, 64; 35 Stat. at L. 1075, 1088, 17
U. S. C. A. No. 1.
4 Act of March 4, 1909, Chap. 320, Sections 1, 64 ; 35 Stat. at L. 1075, 1088,
17 U. S. C, A. No. 1.
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formance for profit," appearing in that section. Considerable
doubt was entertained in the beginning of radio as to whether
this section of the copyright act could be so broad as to
embrace the field of radio broadcasting. It is only from the
cases that have considered the point that we can make a deter-
mination as to the applicability of the act to the new industry
of radio. We turn then to a consideration of the cases touching
each element of the disputed clause. We have not considered
the various elements of the disputed clause in their gram-
matical order, but in what we felt to be their logical order.
II. RADIO BROADCASTING-A PERFORMANCE
In considering the question of "performance" we have been
constrained by the cases involving that particular problem to
consider the termini of broadcasting, viz. radio transmission
and radio reception, as affecting works and compositions com-
ing under copyright law. We shall first consider cases bearing
on the protection of copyrights involving radio reception. A
principal case on this point, holding that radio reception does
amount to a performance, is that of Jewell v. LaSalle Realty
Co.5 However two cases which preceded the Jewell case 6 must
be noted as indicating the attitude toward radio reception as
late as 1929. In Buck v. Debaum 7 a cafe unauthorizedly re-
ceived the licensed broadcast of a musical composition for the
benefits of its patrons. Question was raised as to whether there
was a performance on the part of the cafe. It was held that
the reception did not constitute a performance within the
meaning of the Act. This holding was indicated by the lan-
guage of the court as follows:
The performance, which is licensed as just stated, occurs entire-
ly in the studio of the broadcasting station where the copyrighted
musical composition is lawfully used, and the section occurring
at the receiving set is simultaneous therewith, and is in no sense
a reproduction of the musical composition that is being lawfully
performed at the broadcasting studio. The action, play, and use
of the copyrighted composition has been completed within the
studio.... The owner of a copyrighted musical composition can
fully protect himself..., by refusing to license the broadcasting
station to perform his musical composition, but, when he ex-
5 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. a7l, 51 S. Ct 410, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
6 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. 971, 51 S. Ct. 410, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
7 40 Fed. 2d. 734 (S. D. Calif. 1929).
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pressly licenses and consents to a radio broadcast of his copy-
righted composition, he must be held to have acquiesced in the
utilization of all forces of nature that are resultant from the
licensed broadcast.
By the license to the broadcasting station, the court rea-
soned, the plaintiff impliedly sanctioned and. consented to any
"pick-up" by way of radio reception. The court criticized the
extension of the Copyright ALct to making reception a per-
formance in these words:
It is common knowledge, of which the court should take judicial
notice, that programs from commercial radio broadcasting sta-
tions are interspersed with lectures, instrumental and vocal
musical compositions, sermons, speeches, etc., many of which are
not protected by the copyright laws of the United States, and
many of which can be unconditionally and freely performed by
the broadcasting station, and, if during the reception of such
programs, one using the radio in his business is required to turn
the dial of his receiving set so as to render inaudible any copy-
righted composition, the utmost difficulty and confusion will re-
sult, and a condition ensue that to my mind is unreasonable, and
one that was never within the intent of Congress in passing the
Copyright Act or within the reasonable purview of the terms
thereof.
The case of Buck v. Duncan 8 differed from the Debaum
case 9 in this that in the former the radio station was not
licensed to broadcast the copyrighted composition. However
the conclusion reached as to performance was the same. The
court observed that by maintaining the radio in its hotel for
the entertainment of its guests the defendant did not perform
the musical composition. It was the performance of a musical
composition, not by the defendant, but by the broadcaster on
the defendant's instrument. The holding of the two cases how-
ever was "exploded" by the decision two years later in the
Buck v. Jewell La Salle Realty Co.1O case which concluded that
a public radio reception for profit of a copyrighted musical
composition was a "performance" which made the receiver
liable for an infringement of the Copyright Act.
In Jewell v. La Salle Realty Co.-' action was brought by
8 32 Fed. 2d. 366 (W. . Mo. 1929).
9 40 Fed. 2d. 734 (S. D. Calif. 1929).
10 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. 971, 51 S. Ct. 410, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
11 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. 971, 51 S. Ct. 410, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
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the American Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers
against station KWKC of Kansas City and the La Salle Hotel
for the unauthorized performance of a musical composition
belonging to one of the members of the society. Similar to the
Duncan case12 the broadcasting station was not licensed to
broadcast the composition. Since the case was defended only
as to the hotel company, the decision is important only in that
regard for the particular problem of radio. reception.
The hotel maintained a master radio receiving set with
extensions to public and private rooms for the entertainment
of guests. The lower court reflected the prevailing opinion of
the time, and by a method of analogical reasoning on the part
of Judge Otis concluded, like the Debaum and Duncan cases,1i
that the plaintiff had no right to recover, inasmuch as the
reception did not constitute a performance. Judge Otis com-
pared the radio reception in the hotel to a deaf person who
hears a piano rendition by means of an amplifier which he'
operates (the piano rendition being otherwise inaudible to
him); to the person who hears a piano rendition by means
of a telephone; to the person who opens a window and hears
a street band. He based his decision on the erroneous assump-
tion that radio waves are not a record of the original perform-
ance, but the original performance itself. Their reception
therefore is not a performance but simply a hearing of a per-
formance.
The case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals
which submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States
the following question:
Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his
guests, through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and
loud speakers installed in his hotel and under his control and for
the entertainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted
musical composition which has been broadcast from a radio
transmitting section, constitute a performance of such composi-
tion within the meaning of 17 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1, (e)?
The question was answered by the Supreme Court in the
affirmative.' 4 The final result of the Jewell v. La Salle Realty
12 -32 Fed. 2d. 734 (W. D. Mo. 1929).
13 See notes 7 and 8 supra.
14 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. 971, 51 S. Ct. 410, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
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Co.i5 case was the determination, under the authority of the
highest court in the land, that radio reception did constitute
a performance within the meaning of the copyright act.16
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as permitting the licensee to
grant to others the right to reproduce publicly for profit, by any means,
method or procegs whatsoever, any of the musical compositions within the
repertoire of the Society, so broadcast, or as permitting any receiver 'of
the broadcast of any of said compositions to publicly perform or reproduce
the same for profit by any means, method or process whatsoever. "
We turn then from the reception terminus of radio to reverse,
the transmitting or actual broadcasting of a radio program.
Noteworthy in this regard is the case of Remick v. General
Electric Co.17 Interesting are the opinions given by the lower
court 18 and the appeal court 19 in that case. The lower court
denied the plaintiff relief, adopting the view that the acts of
the broadcaster did not amount to a performance under the
act. It expressed its view thus:
By means of radio art he (the broadcaster) simply makes a
given performance available to a greater number of persons who,
but for his efforts, would not hear it. So :far as practical results
are concerned, the broadcaster of the authorized performance
of a copyrighted musical selection does little more than the
mechanic who rigs an amplifier or loud speaker in a large audi-
torium to the end that persons in remote sections of the hall
may hear what transpires upon its stage or rostrum. Such broad-
casting merely gives the authorized performer a larger audience,
and is not to be regarded as a separate and distinct perform-
ance of the copyrighted composition on the part of the broad-
caster.
The appeal court,20 while not holding definitely that the
broadcast constituted a separate and distinct performance,
nevertheless held the broadcaster liable as a contributory
infringer in "transmitting to the radio audience the original
unauthorized production. It criticizes the reasoning of analogy
adopted by the lower court in the following language:
It is not enough to say that the broadcaster merely opens the
15 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. ed. 971, 51 S. Ct. 410, 76 A. L. R. 1266 (1931).
16 Consequent upon the Debaum and Jewell-LaSalle decisions the American
Society has inserted restrictive provisions in its license agreements with broadcasting
stations, to the effect that:
17 16 Fed. 2d. 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
18 4 Fed. 2d. 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
19 16 Fed. 2d. 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
20 16 Fed. 2d. 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
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window and the orchestra does the rest. On the contrary, the acts
of the broadcaster are found in the reactions of his instruments,
constantly animated and controlled by himself, and those acts are
quite as continuous and infinitely more complex than the playing
of the selection by members of the orchestra.
In such a case the broadcaster is just as guilty of a viola-
tion of the copyright act as is the performer. This fact the
court pointed out in these words:
If he broadcasts without authority from the owner of the copy-
right a private rehearsal of a copyrighted production, thus con-
verting the private rendition into a public performance for profit,
he contributes to the resultant infringement.... the presence or
absence of an audience in the hotel cannot change the character
of his acts of contributory infringement.
As a result of the ruling of the appeal court we may now
conclude that radio transmission amounts to a new and sep-
arate performance.
III. RADIO BROADCASTING--A "PUBLIC" PERFORMANCE
It is almost an asuumed premise that the effect of broad-
casting is to make public the performance of the broadcaster.
Radio production is not thought of in terms of the studio walls
within which a broadcast is produced, but in respect to the
vast public which radio serves. The cases which we have
already considered have more or less taken for granted such
a presumption. Thus in the Remick v. General Electric Co.
case 21 the lower court, for instance, considered broadcasting
as giving the "authorized performer a larger audience (italics
mine) ; while the appeal court spoke of the broadcaster con-
verting the private rendition into a public performance.
In Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co.22 the
broadcasting of a song "Dreamy Melody" by an advertising
radio station was a public performance for profit and consti-
tuted a violation of the copyright owned by the plaintiff.
Defendant operated a radio station as an advertising and pub-
licity medium for the sale of radio parts and accessories which
he manufactured. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the unauthorized
21 4 Fed. 2d. 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
22 5 Fed. 2d. 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
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playing of his copyrighted song. In treating of the public
aspect of the broadcast, the court pointed out that the per-
formance was none the less public because each listener might
enjoy the broadcast alone in the privacy of his home. "Radio
broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach a very
much larger number of the public at the moment of the rendi-
tion than any other medium of performance. The artist is con-
sciously addressing a great, though unseen and widely scat-
tered, audience, and is therefore participating in a public per-
formance."
That radio broadcasting constituted a public performance
became a determined question when the United States Supreme
Court refused to grant certiorari. 23 The general attitude
towards radio broadcasting as being a public performance
prior to the denying of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court in the Remick case24 is evidenced in the'opinion of the
Federal Court for the Southern District of Ohio in that case.2 5
The lower court erroneously ruled as follows,
In order to constitute a public performance in the sense in which
we think Congress intended the *words, it is absolutely essential
that there be an assemblage of persons-an audience congregated
for the purpose of hearing that which transpires at the place of
amusement.... We simply feel that the rendition of a copyrighted
piece of music in the studio of a broadcasting station, where the
public are not admitted and cannot come, but where the sound
waves are converted into radio frequency waves and thus trans-
mitted over thousands of miles of space, to be at last reconverted
into sound waves in the homes of the owners of receiving sets,
is no more-a public performance in the studio, within the intent
of Congress, than the perforated music roll, which enables the
reproduction of copyrighted music by one without musical educa-
tion, is a copy of such music. A private performance for profit is
not within the act, nor is a public performance not for profit.
Contrary to the contention of the broadcasters the Supreme
Court decided that radio broadcasting did come under the
Copyright law in respect to its being a public performance
within the meaning of that act.
23 269 U. S. 556 (1925).
24 5 Fed. 2d. 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
25 298 Fed. 628 (S. D. Ohio 1924).
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IV. RADIO BROADCASTING-A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
"FOR PROFIT"
We have so far treated the 'performance' and 'public'
phases of the "public performance for profit" clause of the
Copyright Act. We have yet to consider the last phrase in that
highly controversial clause of the Act, viz. "for profit." That
angle was touched upon somewhat in the case of Remick and
Co. v. Am. Auto Accessories C0.26 The court there held that
the playing of the melody in the hope and with the expectation
of enhancing the sale of radio parts, although no direct pro-
ceeds were realized from the broadcast, constituted a perform-
ance for profit. "It is immaterial," the court pointed out,
"whether that commercial use be such as to secure direct pay-
ment for the performance by each listener, or indirect pay-
ment, as by a hat-checking charge, when no admission fee is
required, or a general commercial advantage, as by advertising
one's name in the expectation and hope of making profits
through the sale of one's products, be they radio or other
goods." However the case most frequently referred to for a
recognition of the profit angle in radio broadcasting is the
case of Herbert v. Shanley Co.27 Although it does not directly
involve radio, it can be applied in an analogical sense to the
field of radio broadcasting, and has been relied upon in later
cases involving radio litigation on the ,commercial or 'for
profit' phase of the copyright enactment. It will be noted that
it preceded by only two or three years the rise and develop-
ment of the radio industry. In the case a restaurant company
for the entertainment of its paying customers hired an orches-
tra which unauthorizedly played the copyrighted song known
as "Sweethearts" belonging to the plaintiff. The lower court
judges erroneously held that since there was no admission
charged at the door there was no 'performance for profit.'
Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court held contra in the fol-
lowing language :28
The defendant's performances are not eleemosynary. They are
part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the
price of the whole is attributed to a particular item which those
present are expected to order, is not important. It is true that
26 5 Fed. 2d. 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
27 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232, 61 L. ed. 511 (1917).
28 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232, 61 L. ed. 511 (1917).
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the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which
probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The .object is a repast in
surroundings that to people having limited powers of conversa-
tion or disliking the rival noise give a luxurious pleasure not to
be had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay it would
be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether
it pays or not the purpose of employing it is profit and that is
enough.
COPYRIGHT LAW APPLIED TO RADIO BROADCASTING
When we tune in our radio to the currently popular "jazz
band," follow our favorite radio serial story or disport our-
selves intellectually at the expense of radio's greatest comed-
ians we enjoy as it were only the finished product, viz. the
presentation to the public. The work of radio broadcasting
includes more. One of the many details connected with radio
production is its legal phase, especially in respect to copy-
rights. It is the legal interest of the author in the field of radio
broadcasting that has called forth the present article in the
latter regard.
Tremendous success has been achieved in the field of radio
broadcasting since 1920, when there was only one radio sta-
tion in the United States. Radio has developed into a vast
industry. Concurrently with this rapid growth there have
followed the inevitable legal consequences attendant on such
expansion. Particularly have radio broadcasters been opposed
by the interests of artists, composers and publishers whose
compositions and productions grace our air waves today.
In the early days of radio, owners of copyrighted works
considered radio an invaluable advertising ally in the sale and
distribution of their works; little thinking that radio might
soon supersede them. This idealistic outlook of the early com-
posers was evidenced in the opinion of a case in the early
twenties, viz. Witmark and Sons v. Bamberger and Co.,1
wherein the court observed: * * * Our own opinion of the
possibilities of advertising by radio leads us to the belief that
the broadcasting of a newly copyrighted musical composition
would greatly enhance the sales of the printed sheet." From
such a statement there could not be inferred a conclusion that
the copyright owner, by submitting his work or composition
to being broadcast, had divested himself of the exclusive prop-
erty right therein. 2 The court merely pointed out in this early'
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case the then laudable advertising effect of getting the public
acquainted with a musical composition by means of radio. It
observed, however, that this method of advertising was dis-
cretionary with the copyright owners themselves. Its final
words are significant: "He (the copyright owner) has the
exclusive right to publish and vend, as well as to perform."
As radio became less and less eleemosynary and consti-
tuted rather a rival and a competitor of the authors, compos-
ers and publishers than an ally, the latter sought protection
against the encroachment of radio on their property interest
by an application of Constitutional provisions and Congres-
sional enactment to the field of broadcasting.
It has been observed that this decision, which was not too
remote from the rise of. the radio industry,, established some-
what of a precedent for the application of the same doctrine
to the field of radio. Perhaps the first case in radio involving
the subject of 'profit' in connection with broadcasting and
which relied on the holding in the Shanley case 2 9 was that of
Witmark and Sons v. Bamberger and Co.30 Like the Remick
and Co. case 31 which it preceded by two years it involved the
operation of a radio station in connection with a department
store. In the Bamberger case 32 the defendant operated a radio
station for the purpose of advertising and publicizing the
radio parts sold in its department store. The program spon-
sored by the defendant was interspersed throughout with the
following slogan: "L. Bamberger & Co., One of America's
Great Stores, Newark, N. J." The alleged infringement of the
Copyright law was the unauthorized singing over the defend-
ant's station of the song, "Mother Machree." The defendant
sought to distinguish the present case from the Shanley
case,33 averring that in that case there was a direct charge.
The court's reply to this was that although "the diner at no
time had the subject of entertainment charge called to his
attention except in the high price of the food which he was
permitted to procure," nevertheless in the court's opinion, "it
was an indirect way of collecting the charge for musical enter-
29 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232, 61 L. ed. 511 (1917).
30 291 Fed. 776 (D. C. N. J. 1923).
31 5 Fed. 2d. 411 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
32 291 Fed. 776 (D. C. N. J. 1923).
33 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232, 61 L. ed. 511 (1917).
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tainment from those who were there to pay." Applying this
situation to the facts in the Bamberger case 34 the court found
that the cost of broadcasting was made an item of general
expense in the running of the profitable running of the depart-
ment store business of the Bamberger Company. To epitomize
the language of Justice Holmes in the Shanley case 35 the
court, in deciding in favor of the plaintiff said: "Whether it
pays or not the purpose is profit, and that is enough."
Radio broadcasting has become in recent years a highly-
developed industry. To protect-the interests of the artists,
composers and publishers in their copyrighted works, the
copyright law has been interpreted by the judicial decisions to
extend to the rendition of such works over the radio. Because
of the novelty and the comparative recent development of
radio, there was some question at first as to whether a rendi-
tion by radio constituted a "public performance for profit"
within the meaning of the Act. A summation of the foregoing
cases establishes this. proposition in the affirmative.
V. THE MECHANICAL RENDITIOI IN RADIO AND EFFECT
OF COPYRIGHT LAW
We have considered so far only the human 36 performances
of radio artists and actors giving expression to an author's
work or composition. And yet mechanical recordings comprise
the practical and everyday routine of radio broadcasting.37
Under the old copyright act 38 the sale of perforated music,
phonograph records, etc. did not constitute an infringement,
because they were not copies within the meaning of the then
existing copyright act. Thus in White Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co.39 the court said:
These perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly
applied and properly operated in connection with the mechanism
34 291 Fed. 776 (D. C. N. 3. 1923).
35 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232, 61 L. ed. 511 (1917).
36 This -word is chosen to distinguish the performances of artists and actors them-
selves from the mechanical reproduction of a former rendition.
37 The growth of the radio industry has called forth many small stations, -which,
unable to hire the performing artists themselves, have resorted to recorded productions
of such artists for a means of providing entertainment and filling up space on the air.
This has brought on a great deal of litigation not only from the composers but also
from the performing artists whose exclusive interpretation of the composition has given
it a distinctive character peculiar only to the genius and artistry of the interpreter.
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to which they are adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious
combination. But we cannot think that they are copies within the
meaning of the copyright act.
The revised statutes 40 extended copyright protection to
the unauthorized sale of these mechanical devices.
The copyright law itself has not yet been extended so as
to embrace within its protection the broadcasting of the mech-
anical recordings of our modern musical maestros for instance.
It has been settled by the cases that the copyright act can not
be extended thus far.41 At common law however a right of
property was recognized in the products of "mental labor." 42
This common law property right has been recognized in our
copyright law.43 Thus in Aronson v. Baker 44 it was said:
Every new and innocent product of mental labor, which has been
embodied in writing or some other material form, while it
remains unpublished, is the exclusive property of its author,
entitled to the same protection which the law throws around the
possession and enjoyment of other kinds of property.
The performance of an actor or artist is the result of
mental labor and should be given protection as an intellectual
property interest continued until general publication or dedi-
plates. At common law the exclusive right in an intellectual
property interest continued until general publication or dedi-
cation to the public.
As early as 1918 in International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press 45 the court, recognizing a "quasi-property" right
in news for instance, held that the scale of a newspaper,
although it did not constitute a publication as to the compet-
ing news service, did amount to unfair competition, since one
38 Rev. Stat. 4948-71, 17 U. S. C. A. No. I (1926).
39 209 U. S. 1,18, 28 S. Ct. 319,323 (1907).
40 Act of March 4, 1909, Chap. 320 No. 1, 35 Stat. at L. 1075, 17 U. S. C. A.
No. 1 (1926).
41 Muller v. Bemis, 50 Fed. 926 (S. D. N. Y. 1892) ; Barnes v. Miner, 122 Fed.
480 (S. D. N. Y. 1903) ; Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 128 Fed. 977 (E. D. Pa. 1903).
42 Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Reprint 201 (1774) ; Borden v. Amal-
gamated Picture Co. 1 Ch. 386 (1911) ; Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werchmeister, 207 U. S.
284, 28 S. Ct. 72 (1907) ; Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publishing Co., 27 Fed. 2d. 886
(Mass. 1928) ; Univ. Film Co. v. Cooperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d. 1914) ; Aronson
v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 A. 177 (1888) ;"Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872).
43 Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the
author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to
obtain damages therefor. 38 Stat. 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. No. 2 (1926).
44 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 A. 177 (1888).
45 248 U. S. 215, 235 (1918).
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competitor was thereby misappropriating such news as quasi
property to the detriment of the creator of the news.4 6
Keeping in mind the common law recognition of a property
right in the products of mental labor, we turn to the unique
property right had in musical recordings. We find that much
of the spirit and purpose of the Copyright Act has been
observed by the courts in extending protection to these musical
interpretations. The case of Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station 47 is a notable example. In that case the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the defendant station from broadcasting his "rec-
orded performances," on which he had stamped the words
"For Home Use Only." Although, the court pointed out, the
copyright law did not apply in-the case, nevertheless the spirit
of the Act was observed in giving protection to the artist
Waring on the basis of his having a property right in his rec-
ordings. The court held that the interpretative genius of the
artist brings forth something novel, and of intellectual and
artistic value which will be recognized as a property right.
Further such a right is not lost by publication when the rec-
ords have printed on them: "For home use only." By stamp--
ing on the records "For home use only" there was a public
dedication only as to the purchasers of records for use on
phonographs, and not a dedication to competitors who might
profit from them at the expense of the plaintiff. This line of
reasoning had been adhered to in Associated Press v. Interna-
tional News Service 48 and was relied on in the Waring case.4 9
It is desirable that the recorded musical interpretation of the
artist be given the same protection under the copyright law
as is afforded the composer for the unauthorized perform-
ances of his musical compositions. By his talents and inter-
pretative ability the performing artist creates something new
and unique. Through his interpretative genius he differen-
tiates his work from that of any other performer. 50 His posi-
tion is analogous to that of the composer who creates some-
46 The case of Fonotipa v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951 (E. D. N. Y. 1909) held that
it was unfair competition to misappropriate the property of the composer of the musi-
cal composition in a phonograph record.
47 194 A. 631 (Sup. Ct. of Pa. 1937).
48 248 U. S. 215, 235 (1918).
49 194 A. 631 (Sup. Ct. of Pa. 1937).
50 Nims in his work Unfair Competition says: "It has been held that an actor
has rights in the characteristic style of acting ustd by him, and by which he is known
to and distinguished by the publiC."
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thing new in writing the musical composition. In a later
Waring case, viz. Waring v. Dunlea 51 the plaintiff, Waring,
was likewise granted an injunction to restrain the defendant's
unlicensed broadcasting of plaintiff's. orchestra recordings,
where the plaintiff had granted permission for their use only
for a de signated program and the defendant had exceeded
such permission. The court held that an orchestra leader has
an exclusive property right in his performance of musical
numbers in a distinctive style created by him, and has a right
to prohibit their unauthorized performance. The results of
such artistry of interpretation have a pecuniary worth that
deserves to be protected along with other property rights.
Such rights, we have pointed out, were protected at common
law. The Copyright Act52 does recognize such a property right
in the products of mental labor. Since the performing artist
does have a common law right, and if he does not divest him-
self of such right by -publication, he is entitled to a remedy by
injunction against the unauthorized presentation of his work.
VI. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS
AND RADIO SCRIPT
We have considered thus far mainly musical compositions
of artists, composers and publishers and the human and mech-
anical rendition oftheir works, in so far as the performances
thereof may be inconsistent with the rule or spirit of the
copyright act. There is, however, in connection with radio yet
another property interest that appeals for protection to the
Copyright Act, viz. the property interest in ideas.
At common law no protection was to be given to the orig-
inator of an abstract idea on the ground that there was no
property interest therein. 53 The copyright law protects only
the author's peculiar expression of ideas, not the ideas them-
selves. We have noted heretofore that at common. law protec-
tion was given to the products of mental labor. It is the policy
of the courts to veer away from litigation involving ideas, on
the ground that ideas are so ephemeral and abstract that the
53 Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 Fed. 401 (W. D. Mich. 1908);
Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 A. 436 (1906); Bristol v. The Equitable Assur-
ance Society, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892).
51 Fed. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939).
52 35 Stat. 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. No. 2 (1926).
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courts would be flooded with fictitious and sundry suits on the
part of originators of ideas if they were to give ear to their
many and facetious allegations of unfair competition and
infringement of the Copyright Act. But the concrete expres-
sion of ideas may take on a peculiar value. In recent years,
however, the expression of ideas has become so tied up with
the field of advertising as to give the expression of ideas a
property value worthy of protection against misappropriation.
Concrete ideas with such value have been defined as the
reduction to tangible form of something original and novel,
on which the creator's effort and labor were exerted. Such
ideas have been protected on the ground that their misap-
propriation amounted to unfair competition. On the basis of
unfair competition 54 protection has been afforded such mod-
ern day advertising ideas and slogans as "No thanks, I smoke
Chesterfields," appearing in a picture advertisement;55 "The
Beer of the Century" ;56 and "A Macy Xmas and a Happy
New Year." 57
Program ideas and radio script may have a peculiar prop-
erty interest to authorize their protection against unlawful
infringement. In American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co. et
al.58 the plaintiff was owner of a radio quiz show entitled
"Double or Nothing." Plaintiff charged that defendant, who
had a similar program entitled "Take it or Leave it," was
guilty of infringement of plaintiff's copyright and trademark
and also of unfair competition. Plaintiff's motion was dis-
missed. The court refused to give the plaintiff relief on the
ground that there was no evidence that the words "Double oi
Nothing" or "Take it or Leave it" had become associated in
the public mind with the plaintiff as to give him a property
interest therein. Because of the highly commercial interest in
radio broadcasting today it would seem that the broadcaster
should have just as much a property right in his program as
the artist in his musical composition.
54 Unfair competition consists in the palming off of the goods or business of one
person as that of another: Neva-Wet Corp. of America v. Never Wet Processing Corp.
277 N. Y. 163, 13 N. E. 2d. 755 (1938).
55 Liggett and Myers Co. v. Meyer, 161 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 205 (1935).
56 Ryan v. Century Brewing Association, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d. 1053 (1936).
57 Healey v. I H., Macy & Co., 251 App. Div. 440, 297 N. Y. Supp. 163
(1st Dept. 1937).
58 36 F. Supp. 167 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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Radio script may be the subject of copyright protection.
The case of Uproar v. Nt. Broadcasting Co.59 represents the
protection given the script of a popular radio comedian.
Against the contention of the plaintiff that he had been
assigned the right to publish the broadcasts; the defendants,
the Texas company sponsoring th& show and the Natioi&l
Broadcasting Company, interposed that to do so would violate
contract rights which they then had. The comedian Wynn had
been hired by the Texas company to put on a half hour show
each week. The National Broadcasting Company had con-
tracted with the announcer Graham McNamee for "the exclu-
sive management of his services, trade name or names and
productions for all purposes of whatsoever kind and nature."
In one of the parts of the script the name "Graham" appeared
forty-five times. The court ruled against the right of the plain-
tiff to broadcast the script in which appeared the name "Gra-
ham," as also all script of Wynn while he Was the radio star
of the Texas company. The court pointed out that the script
was prepared by Wynn under his contract with the Texas com-
pany, and under such circumstances the production belonged
to the employer. And in behalf of the National Broadcasting
Company the court observed that the name of "Graham McNa-
mee" had acquired a very substantial intrinsic value, apart
from McNamee's services as a radio announcer, for advertis-
ing purposes. Hence the name had acquired a particular prop-
erty right which equity would protect.
VII. THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS,
AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS
To protect the property interest in their musical composi-
tions, recordings and mental creations the authors, composers
and publishers who were scattered here and there found that
in unity there was strength. Single handed the individual
artist could do nothing. The expense alone of seeking redress
against an unauthorized performance of an artist's work
would preclude the bringing of any action. Under such cir-
cumstances the individual is the victim of his own creative
genius and can do nothing in a practical way against the mis-
•appropriation of his ingenious creations.
59 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. C. Mass. 1934).
RADIO COPYRIGHT LAW
Out of this situation there arose, for the protection of
rights under copyright law and their enforcement, the organ-
ization known as the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (popularly referred to as A S C A P). Being
an unincorporated association organized under the laws of the
State of New York for the purpose of licensing performances
of copyright music for profit, it is composed of more than a
thousand authors, composers and publishers. There was defi-
nitely a need for some such organization, so that the music
producers and composers of America might present a strong
front for the enforcement of their rights under the copyright
law. As a recent case pointed out, viz. Buck v. Harton,60 the
individual composer previously had no practical means of
enforcing the exclusive rights given him under the copyright
act, and any litigation that might be involved for the enforce-
ment of such rights would involve too great expense and time
to the individual. Now such matters are handled by the asso-
ciation, and an accounting of royalties, etc. is made to the
individual members. Likewise the association serves as an
agency of the individual authors to deal with those wishing to
obtain public performance rights and privileges. In protecting
and enforcing the rights of the individual authors, composers
and publishers the Society has performed a beneficial and use-
ful service.
When the broadcasters realized the strength of the Society
they began to negotiate with them for the use of the copyright
compositions. The practical result on the part of the Society
is to grant blanket licenses to such broadcasters. The efforts
of the Society at organization and control of their copyright
works have proven successful and of benefit to the thousand
or more members who comprise the association.
CONCLUSION
To conclude this article we may make a brief summation
of the material treated. We saw that there was a Constitu-
tional authorization for copyright enactment. It was particu-
larly with Article 1, Section (e) of the Act that we concerned
ourselves in the first portion of the material. It was judicially
determined from the cases adduced in support thereof that the
60 F. Supp. 1014 (1940 D. C.).
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Copyright Act is applicable to radio broadcasting and that
radio broadcasting may be a "public performance for profit"
within the meaning of that Act. To that point we dealt only
with human performances and their application to copyright
law. We noted however that much of radio time is taken up
with recordings. Although the Copyright Act is not directly
applicable to musical recordings; yet the recording artist by
his interpretative genius and ability creates something novel
and unique, which courts, adopting the spirit of the Copyright-
Act, have protected against infringement because-of the prop-
erty interest involved. It is analogous to the property interest
that in this modern day of radio is attached also to concrete
ideas and radio script. It is to the American Society of
Authors, Composers and Publishers that much is owed for the
recognition of such property right and the application of the
Copyright Act to radio broadcasting. It is the united effort of
the Society that has brought about to the individual members
the recognition of those rights under Copyright law which they
were powerless previously to enforce.
This article was born of the interest of the author in radio
broadcasting, and with a view to serve soon in some branch
of communications of the military forces of our country. Need-
less to say that that interest has been stimulated and enhanced
throughout the writing of this paper. The author feels himself
generously rewarded in the satisfaction felt on its final com-
pletion and the pleasure experienced in the pursuit of its
attainment.
Leo L. Linck
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